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Abstract This essay asks whether there is a relation
between action-serving and meaning-serving intentions.
The idea that the intentions involved in meaning and action
are nominally designated alike as intentionalities does not
guarantee any special logical or conceptual connections
between the intentionality of referential thoughts and
thought-expressive speech acts with the intentionality of
doing. The latter category is typified by overt physical
actions in order to communicate by engaging in speech
acts, but also includes at the origin of all artistic and
symbolic expression such cerebral and linguistic doings as
thinking propositional thoughts. There are exactly four
possibilities by which meaning and action intentionalities
might be related to be systematically investigated. Mean-
ing-serving and action-serving intentionalities, topologi-
cally speaking, might exclude one another, partially
overlap with one another, or subsume one in the other or
the other in the one. The theoretical separation of the two
ostensible categories of intendings is criticized, as is their
partial overlap, in light of the proposal that thinking and
artistic and symbolic expression are activities that favor the
inclusion of paradigm meaning-serving intentions as
among a larger domain of action-serving intentions. The
only remaining alternative is then developed, of including
action-serving intentions reductively in meaning-serving
intentions, and is defended as offering in an unexpected
way the most cogent universal reductive ontology in which
the intentionality of doing generally relates to the specific
intentionality of referring in thought to the objects of
predications, and of its artistic and symbolic expression.
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1 Searle’s Intentionality ‘Pun’
There appears to be a difference between the intentionality
of reference and the intentionality of action. When I act, I
intend to do something, but in the process it seems at least
superficially that I do not always refer to any intended
object. If true, this apparent asymmetry minimally suggests
that intending to do and intending to refer are so unrelated
that an agent can do things without referring to any
intended object of thought, even though, in an obvious
sense, to refer to an intended object in thought or language
is also to do something.
The disconnection between intentionality in reference
and intentionality in action is sharply pronounced in John
R. Searle’s 1983 study, Intentionality: An Essay in the
Philosophy of Mind. There Searle maintains that to speak
univocally of referential intending and intending to act, as
collecting under one terminology the intentionality of
thought, expression, and action, is at most only a ‘pun’ or
equivocation involving the same word with easily confused
but conceptually radically discordant meanings. Searle
writes:
…intending and intentions are just one form of
Intentionality among others, they have no special
status. The obvious pun on ‘‘Intentionality’’ and
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‘‘intention’’ suggests that intentions in the ordinary
sense have some special role in the theory of Inten-
tionality; but on my account intending to do some-
thing is just one form of Intentionality along with
belief, hope, fear, desire, and lots of others; and I do
not mean to suggest that because, for example, beliefs
are Intentional they somehow contain the notion of
intention or they intend something or someone who
has a belief must thereby intend to do something
about it. In order to keep this distinction completely
clear I will capitalize the technical sense of ‘‘Inten-
tional’’ and ‘‘Intentionality’’. Intentionality is direct-
edness; intending to do something is just one kind of
Intentionality among others.1
On Searle’s view, it is as though we use the words ‘intend’,
‘intending’, ‘intentionality’ and cognates only through a
series of unfortunate linguistic accidents in semantics,
philosophy of mind, and action theory. The situation in
these philosophical subdisciplines might be comparable
then to the happenstances in the evolution of colloquial
language by which we have come to use the same word
‘times’ for the mathematics of arithmetical multiplication
and for moments of temporal succession. Thereafter, Searle
adds on the same page: ‘Related to the pun on ‘‘inten-
tional’’ and ‘‘Intentional’’ are some other common
confusions’.2
Such equivocations are rife in ordinary discourse, from
which they also contaminate philosophical terminologies.
They are taken over from these sources as are all technical
nomenclatures, refined for more precise expression in
philosophy and other disciplines. When a vocabulary is
conceptually compromised at the source, it can play havoc
in our later thinking, of the sort Ludwig Wittgenstein
mentions in Philosophical Investigations §109, when he
declares that: ‘Philosophy is a battle against the bewitch-
ment of our intelligence by means of language’.3 We must
confront conceptually confused nomenclature that often
constrains thought, even if we try to turn away from all
those accidental equivocations in the evolution of natural
language, and consider instead only an ideal language, such
as Gottlob Frege’s Begriffsschrift, in which these problems
are avoided by syntax restrictions that prevent all terms in
colloquial language from having both Sinn and Bedeutung,
and preclude any term from equivocally having more than
one Sinn, and, hence, from having more than one
Bedeutung.4
Is the situation much the same with respect to the
common word ‘intention’ as it is found in some everyday
and some contemporary philosophical discourse? Are the
words ‘intend’, ‘intention’, and ‘intentionality’ used
equivocally in speaking of referential semantics and the
metaphysics of action? Are the intentionality of reference
and the intentionality of action, meaning-serving and
action-serving, two distinct and philosophically unrelated
things that historically just happen accidentally to have
shared the same form of letters as their common name, but
between which respective concepts there is no further
interesting conceptual interconnection? Or is there some
deeper linkage between the intentions of reference and the
intentions of action, suggesting a more unified theory of the
two phenomena? If so, then both of these applications of
‘intention’ together might be required in some sense of
what is usually considered definitive of a rational respon-
sible human thinker and agent. Does the intentionality of
reference and action present us only with a pun, as Searle
contends, a bald equivocation, or does the terminology
reflect even in its ordinary language roots that conceptually
these two categories are somehow inseparably joined?
2 Speech Acts and Referring as Doing
Those who are skeptical of Searle’s point may propose
reductively identifying the intending in reference with
intending in action generally, on the grounds that to refer is
also to act, to do something. Searle provokes independently
motivated inquiry as to whether we can break apart the two
meanings of intentionality, or whether there is a more
intimate relation between intending to refer to something
and intending more generally to do something, especially
anything resulting in physical action.
There are four possibilities in a re-examination of the
question as to whether or not there is anything in common
between the intentionality of reference and the intention-
ality of action, with physical action or bodily activity in
focus. We begin by distinguishing semantic and action
theory intentionality hypothetically in these ways, allowing
1 John R. Searle, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 3.
2 Ibid.
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Third edition;
translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Co., Inc., 1968).
4 Gottlob Frege, Begriffscrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete
Formelsprache des reinen Denkens. Halle 1879. Translated by Jean
van Heijenoort as Begriffsschrift, a Formula Language, Modeled
upon that of Arithmetic, for Pure Thought, in van Heijenoort, From
Frege to Go¨del: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 1–82; especially
Part I, Definition of the Symbols, Judgment, §§2–4, pp. 11–14. See
Frege, ‘U¨ber Sinn und Bedeutung’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Philosophie und
philosophische Kritik, 100, 1892, pp. 25–50. Translated as, ‘On Sense
and Reference’, in P.T. Geach and Max Black, Translations from the




that in principle meaning-serving and action-serving senses
of intentionality might be:
1. Totally distinct.
2. Partially distinct and partially overlapping.
3. Subsumption of the intentionality of reference by the
intentionality of action.
4. Subsumption of the intentionality of action by the
intentionality of reference.
We critically consider each of these four possibilities in
turn, and in some instances under a variety of plausible
branching interpretations.
2.1 Semantic-Action Intending Relation (1)
Possibility (1) seems to be the position that Searle endor-
ses. It might seem eminently reasonable, particularly in the
absence of a plausible theory relating the two types or
applications of intentionality as more than equivocal talk
about mutually exclusive concepts, extensionally to divide
the intentionality of action from the intentionality of
meaning without so much as a grudging partial overlap.
If we choose to do so, moreover, then we gain the fur-
ther advantage of having distinct concepts of intentionality
each tailored to its task of explaining the directedness of
action to a purpose, end or goal, and the relation by which
the mind refers to things as objects of predicative and
inferential thought, and in a thought’s artistic and symbolic
expression and communication. The tradeoff of having
distinct specific concepts of meaning-serving and action-
serving intentionalities, the cost of maintaining such an
opulent explanatory parallelism, is that we sacrifice the
explanatory aesthetics, generality and elegance of a
reductive theory that somehow satisfactorily relates
meaning-serving and action-serving intentionality under a
single concept of intentionality, of which an intelligent
thinking subject and acting agent can have intentions that
are relevant in different ways to the intendings involved
respectively in meaning and action.
We can test some of these proposals by including non-
human animals also in our deliberations. Even here, how-
ever, we need not regard what animals do as actions in the
requisite sense, and we can accordingly understand animal
movement as non-intentional or extra-intentional, without
worrying whether nonhuman animals are capable of any
sort of semantic intentionality, of referring to things in
thought, assuming that they think, or have evolved some
kind of proto-language or primitive entirely extra-linguistic
but still symbolic mode of thinking, or even expressive
communication.
Nor, however, precisely for the same reason, can we
hope at persuasion by arguing on behalf of Searle’s implied
exclusive bifurcation of the intentionality of reference as
contrasted with the intentionality of action in the case of
nonhuman animals. Searle marks the distinction he wants
to emphasize orthographically by capitalizing semantic
‘Intentionality’ as opposed to the uncapitalized ‘intentions’
of action. We are hard-pressed to propose that animals
manifestly exhibit the intentionality of action, of doing
something that at some level and in some sense they may
even intend to do, although as extra-linguistic, as these
matters are often oversimplified, inarticulate beasts are
presumably nonparticipants in anything sufficiently
resembling the semantic intentionality of thought or artistic
or symbolic expression worthy of the name.5
If, however, contrary to Searle, in the human paradigm
that for obviously and defensibly justifiable reasons is
taken as the benchmark for intentionality in both semantics
and action theory, these are logically or conceptually
related, we can intend to refer. If referring is a special kind
of doing, a unique category of mental or more overt
physical action, then Searle cannot be right to draw a sharp
distinction between the intentionality of meaning in par-
ticular and the intentionality of doing more generally. For I
can try and fail to refer, just as I can try and fail to cross the
street or tie my shoelaces. I may want to refer to the first
Holy Roman Emperor by his historic personal name, but I
cannot recall that it is Ludwig I, or I refer to someone else
by mistakenly using another individual’s name. Or I may
stammer and stutter, in the event, and do not succeed in
completing the intended and desired semantic action at all,
perhaps not even in thought. Nor should we assume that
Searle would want to take issue with any of these com-
monplace observations.6
The question is whether these shared characteristics, as
kinds of intentionality or Intentionality, including proper-
ties and especially relations involving psychological
occurrences, whether in action or semantic reference,
reflect anything essential about the intentionality of refer-
ence and the intentionality of action. I think they do,
whereas Searle tries to own the word ‘Intentionality’ for
semantic purposes, and otherwise considers philosophical
discourse about meaning-serving and action-serving
intentionality to be at best an amusing equivocation and
5 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Essay on the Origins of Human
Knowledge (Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines, 1746).
Translated and edited by Hans Aarsleff (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
6 Searle in the cluster description theory of reference in his early
essay ‘Proper Names’, Mind, 67, 1958, pp. 166–173, is committed to
the possibility that I can intend to refer to Aristotle by using the
proper name ‘Aristotle’, but fail to do so if I do not have available for
explication at least one description that truly applies to the named
object. See the essays collected in the volume, John Searle’s
Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning and Mind, edited by
Ssavas L. Tsohatzidis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007).
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otherwise at worst a potential source of philosophical
confusion.
Searle nevertheless agrees that the two categories of
intentionality are properties of thought, of psychological
occurrences, although they need not be in any other sense
cognitive for all that Searle argues. They could be abstract,
logical, mathematical or metaphysical. Still, they are in all
events conceptual, applying in the two cases to a thinker’s
psychology. That is already something more than mere
random equivocation of the sort by which the same word
‘bank’ is used to refer equivocally both to a financial
institution and the edge of a body of water. We do not seem
to be dealing with quite so rough a pun, even if Searle is
right, but also admittedly with something less than
straightforward logical or conceptual linkage. From the fact
that action-serving and meaning-serving intentions are
designated alike as involving intentionality, it does not
follow that within the general concept of intentionality
there is any deeper interrelation between action-serving
and meaning-serving intentions. They can belong side by
side as completely distinct instances of intentionality,
psychological in the most general sense, without there
existing any further connection between intentionality of
thought in meaning and in actions and decisions to act.
That, anyway, is how one might reasonably understand
Searle in the pun passage from Intentionality.7
Logically, Searle is on solid ground resisting the prop-
osition that it would be justified to expect an overlap
between action-serving and meaning-serving intentions.
From the fact that a common terminology umbrellas both
categories as kinds of intentionality or Intentionality, and
that both are in some sense psychological, involving
intending something in reference and action, it does not
follow that the intendings by which reference is achieved in
thought and language are the same as those by which
decisions to act occur and subsequent actions are per-
formed. By analogy, both horses and dogs have the prop-
erty in common of being quadrupeds, besides being
placental mammals, vertebrates, biological entities, and
much else besides, but horses are not dogs, nor vice versa,
and there is no extensional inclusion or overlap of dogs and
horses despite the evident overlap of many of their
properties.
If we needed only an overlapping of the properties of the
intentionality of reference and of action in order to evi-
dence an overlapping of the intentionality of reference and
of action themselves, then it should suffice merely to
observe that both share in common being referred to by the
same word ‘intentionality’ or ‘Intentionality’. That sort of
nominal agreement would clearly be insufficient to bring
the concepts of semantic and action theory intentionality
into any special interrelation. The approach, needless to
say, simply will not do, at least in the present case, how-
ever much it might work for Kent Bach’s similar but still
importantly different purposes in his analogous and inspi-
rational Nominal Description Theory (NDT) of the mean-
ings of names.8 Bach’s NDT merely extends the Tarskian
disquotational theory of sentence meaning in the sense of
sentence truth conditions, from ‘‘Snow is white’’ means
Snow is white to the referential meaning of the name N is
‘the bearer of ‘‘N’’’, and in that sense Bach’s NDT can
hardly be resisted by those who already like their meanings
disquotational. All said, it nevertheless appears from the
fact that referring is a specific kind of doing, a mental or
linguistic expressive action, already begins to blur attempts
to make out a sharp distinction, as Searle may suggest,
between the intentionality of reference and the intention-
ality of action, semantic intending and action theory
intending, that would support the idea that we are merely
punning to use the same word in both kinds of applications.
It is noteworthy in this regard that semantic philosophy
has widely and emphatically recognized that a pure for-
malism in the theory of meaning cannot hope to attain
adequate explication of a word’s or sentence’s meaning
without either an integrated or superadded pragmatics, and
even a contextualized pragmatics, by which the content as
well as the form of symbolic meaning can be represented,
and formally extensionally indistinguishable ambiguities
can be properly disambiguated. Later Wittgensteinians
should join the chorus against Searle here, because in the
posthumous publications, especially The Blue Book and
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein understands the
naming of an individual significantly for present purposes
as a rule-governed move in a language game, and hence as
an action or something that we do.9
Searle and Wittgenstein share an interest in the back-
ground conditions of symbolic meaning, which Searle
indeed nominates as ‘The Background’.10 It is a question of
7 Searle, Intentionality, Chapter 1, ‘The Nature of Intentional States’,
pp. 1–36. For criticism, compare Joshua Rust, John Searle (London:
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2009), pp. 51–54; 66–73.
8 Kent Bach, Thought and Reference (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1987). See especially Bach’s development of the Nominal Descrip-
tion Theory (NDT), pp. 133–174. The suggestion is that on Bach’s
NDT we might try to explain the meaning of Searle’s ‘intentionality’
as ‘the bearer of [the word] ‘‘intentionality’’’ and ‘Intentionality’ as
‘the bearer of [the word] ‘‘Intentionality’’’.
9 Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for
the Philosophical Investigations, edited by Rush Rhees; 2nd edition
(New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 11–13. Philosophical
Investigations §§225; 562–567.
10 Searle, Intentionality, Chapter 5, ‘The Background’, pp. 141–159.
The phrase makes it seem as though the Background is an identifiable
thing that consists of and contains things we can comprehensively and
indisputably know. Searle nevertheless allows himself some leeway
in this implied determinate characterization by switching to the
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moment whether what Wittgenstein means by ‘Lebens-
form’ is in any way directly related to Searle’s ‘The
Background’. In both cases, the concepts seem intended to
comprehend whatever is needed to make a semantic theory
of symbolic meaning work, and especially anything pre-
supposed by the possibility of expressing and communi-
cating ideas symbolically. Similar considerations apply
with appropriate adjustments also for artistic expression.
Wittgenstein explains language game rules as determined
like the rules of other games by a game’s point and pur-
pose. There must be reasons for the rules we follow in
games, and they must generally contribute to the utility, fun
or challenge of playing the game. Wittgenstein and Searle
might well agree that it is not just on such a thin conception
of naming and doing as alike psychological both in con-
scious thought and external speech acts and other behavior
that they are related. The connection is rather on the
grounds that naming is already a specific kind of doing, one
among a multitude of things we can do in speech acts in
order to achieve a variety of purposes. We intend to refer
and to communicate our intentions in order to return from
the market with five red apples, or to get helper B to bring a
slab or beam when it is needed in the course of doing
something else, if we are engaged in architectural
activity.11
We name and use names as tools for a variety of things
we do in a greater context of doings. These doings can fit
together in complex ways with more encompassing scopes
and in means-ends relations, as when we mix pigments in
order to paint, and as potentially part of yet another action
to which the action of mixing pigments may be further
subordinate. The same insight is enshrined in the semantic
discussion and even in the title of J.L. Austin’s (1962)
posthumously published 1955 William James lectures on
How to Do Things With Words.12 We do something,
accomplish some part of our business in the world, when
we name things or learn their pre-existent names, and use
the names we devise or acquire in intending to refer to
exactly these things and communicate our thoughts about
them with other intelligent language users for a variety of
cooperative and competitive purposes. When we use
propositions in their logical interrelations to construct and
critically evaluate theories, to understand the state of
things, and make action plans for future decision-making
and execution. Intending is doing, on such a conception,
whether it is referring, itself an action, or doing something
else, engaging in more overt physical action that is itself
also at least partly semantic, or otherwise entirely extra-
semantic.
We have in any case by now reached the point where we
have cast sufficient doubt on the truth and perhaps even the
cogency of Searle’s charge that we merely pun when we try
to relate the intentionality of meaning and the intentionality
of action as anything more than mutually exclusive in an
extensionally equivocal historical accident. There is
something more interesting going on in the intentionality of
referring and the intention to act, given that referring is a
kind of mental or expressive act, than a regrettable termi-
nological coincidence. A correct comprehensive philoso-
phy of mind and language needs to disambiguate and
somehow relate meaning-serving and action-serving
intentionality, if it is going to make worthwhile progress
either in semantic philosophy or action theory.13
We do not refute Searle’s concept in defense of (1), or the
remark that to speak univocally of intending, intentionality,
etc., in the case of reference and action is to indulge in a
potentially philosophically hazardous pun. Instead, we pro-
pose only that there are several kinds of reasons previously
examined at least briefly to consider that Searle’s support of
(1) is not water-tight, prompting the serious consideration of
alternatives (2–4), to decide if they have advantages or
disadvantages to be weighed against the intuitive justifica-
tion, such as it is, for the mutual exclusion of semantic and
action theory senses of intentionality in model (1). We do
not preclude the possibility that Searle might also incline to
an alternative other than (1) in light of these arguments,
especially in favor of category (2).
2.2 Semantic-Action Intending Relation (2)
Choice (2) seems to offer a sensible compromise between
(1) and some of the objections that have been raised against
it. Perhaps some though not all semantic intentionality is
also actional (praxeological) or action-serving. Arguably,
some but not all semantic occurrences involve actions.
If I am badly immobile, not doing anything that would
obviously constitute action, I might still be daydreaming,
and in my thoughts thinking about and hence intending the
Footnote 10 continued
indefinite article occasionally, and speaking instead of a ‘a Back-
ground’ rather than ‘The Background’. The identity conditions for
Searle’s Background to semantic intentionality of thought and its
expression are accordingly as elusive and in the same ways as
Wittgenstein’s references to Lebensformen (forms of life). See Barry
Stroud, ‘The Background of Thought’ in John Searle and his Critics,
edited by Ernest Lepore and Robert Van Gulick (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1991), Part V, ‘The Background of Intentionality and
Action’, pp. 245–258. Nick Fotion, John Searle (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001), Chapter 6, ‘Network and Background in
Mental States and Language’, pp. 99–116.
11 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, especially §§2, 11,
23–27, 199.
12 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words. William James
Lectures. 2nd edition. Edited by J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa`
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).
13 Searle, Intentionality, Chapter 3, ‘Intention and Action’,
pp. 79–111.
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Eiffel Tower, intending the structure without intending to
do anything physical involving the Eiffel Tower, as I might
if I alternatively intend to climb it or paint it or blow it up
or use it as a philosophical illustration. Whereas some
semantic intendings might also be action-serving or doings
in the ordinary sense, it is not clear that all are, which
intuition suggests support for at least part of their partial
overlap. The second aspect of partial overlap here might
then be carried by such examples as those in which actions
are generally intentional (unsurprisingly) in the action-
serving sense, but not generally intentional in the semantic
or meaning-serving sense.
We might find this in cases where we act intentionally
(to speak redundantly for emphasis, on the assumption that
all action worthy of the name is intentional in the action-
serving sense), but where reference or semantic relation is
not conspicuously indispensibly involved. For example, I
intend to tie my shoelaces, and I do so, but without
entertaining any thoughts that intend any objects. I do not,
at least on some occasions, think about my shoes or their
laces or the fact that they stand in need of being retied, or
any other intended object or state of affairs. Rather, in the
relevant situation, I notice at some pre-reflective and
therefore presumably pre-linguistic, and hence pre-
semantic level that my laces need to be retied, so that
without another thought I simply act by tying them, as
though by a reflex action, performing the necessary
motions spontaneously without any evident referential
intermediation. I may even be surprised to discover during
or after the process that I have been tying or have just tied
my shoes. If these examples are convincing, as they should
be only for anyone with similar experiences, then, although
some action-serving intentionality is also meaning-serving,
not all meaning-serving intentionality is action-serving.
The question is naturally whether in fact the examples do in
fact show what they have been interpreted as showing.
There is an argument, accordingly, for the alternative
interpretation of the relation between meaning-serving and
action-serving intentions in option (2). The question is
whether it is decisive, or susceptible of being overturned
and preliminary judgments in favor of (2) reversed.
It might be objected that the examples do not go deep
enough or take into account all crucially relevant nuances of
intentionality, action, meaning and reference, to get to the
bottom of the question as to how action-serving and meaning-
serving intentionality can be understood as related, if at all.
An argument to be made against (2) in this regard could take
one or both parts of the partial overlap of action-serving and
meaning-serving intentionality under criticism. We consider
these in the same order of exposition as above.
Against (2A): Action need not be physical or involve
bodily motion in the ordinary sense, but should be understood
generally to include mental or psychological acts. If I am
daydreaming about the Eiffel Tower while remaining virtu-
ally immobile on my sofa, then I am certainly engaged in
meaning-serving intentionality insofar as my thought is about
something, and in particular insofar as I am thinking about
the Eiffel Tower. We can safely ignore the fact that idle
thoughts are typically accompanied, if not also caused or
occasioned by, supervenient upon, or even ontically reduc-
ible to, electrochemical brain events, many if not all of which
are presumably not under my conscious, deliberate action-
serving or meaning-serving intentional control.
What should not fail to be paid sufficient heed is the fact
on the present interpretation that intending the Eiffel Tower
is itself already a mental act. It is doing something, and,
indeed, doing something rather specific that can only be
exactly specified in intensional rather than extensional dis-
course within the resources of an intensional rather than
purely extensional logic. It is making reference to an exis-
tent or nonexistent object in an act of mind, such that, if we
extend the concept of action, as we should, to include both
physical and mental acts, then we act mentally in intending
the Eiffel Tower, even if no further physical act is made
consequent upon the semantic relation of our referential
mental action. The daydreaming scenario in that case does
not prove beyond reasonable doubt that there can be an
instance of meaning-serving intentionality that is not also
simultaneously an instance of action-serving intentionality.
The example is anyway subject to controversion, and as
such lacking in decisive force in upholding model (2)
against the alternatives, and especially against (3) and (4).
Against (2B): We must seriously inquire in this connection
whether we can act, physically or mentally, but especially
physically, insofar as these categories are justifiably distin-
guished, without reference, without thinking, and, more perti-
nently in the immediate context, without any meaning-serving
intention. We encounter most frontally in this regard the dif-
ficult and philosophically momentous question as to whether
we can ever engage in action-serving intentionality without
engaging of necessity as well in meaning-serving intentional-
ity. Can the two be logically or conceptually separated as the
argument in support of option (2B) seems to require?
We may try to flesh out the example more fully to
further clarify what is entailed. If I tie my shoelaces as an
action, then, on the usual analytic expectation, I must
intend to do so. Otherwise we usually do not call the
motions an action. This much is granted, although we also
need to ask whether or not such action-serving intention-
ality can exist or fulfill its role in the explanation of action
as an intentional phenomenon without at some level also
being meaning-serving in its intentionality. If I intend to tie
my shoelaces, however rapid or subconscious the intention,
implicit or explicit among my acts of consciousness, then
my action-serving intention must also ineluctably consti-
tute a specific meaning-serving intention.
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I mean to do something specific, at least in the example
under consideration. And that is not offered as a pun, but in
the literal sense of the word. It is to say that my intending
thought, whatever its status and circumstances in my
cognitive economy, must refer, contrary to the superficial
gloss given for (2B), specifically to my shoelaces, my
shoes, and the state of affairs in which my untied shoelaces
are untied or become tied from a state of being untied.
Perhaps I am motivated to tie my shoes by the projection in
thought of a plausible but as-yet nonexistent state of affairs
which I act in order to prevent, imagining my tripping
dangerously over the loose strings to risk injury. I do not
need to rehearse the corresponding expressive words and
phrases consciously in thought in order to have these
thoughts, which I reconstruct imaginatively now at my
leisure. I do not need to do so in order to refer in fast-
moving thought to the intended objects that would be
intended in the meaning-serving sense were I explicitly to
run through these terms and sentences tacitly in my mind,
as though mentally narrating to myself what I action-
serving intend to do in preparing to tie my shoelaces.
It is worth emphasizing that we have as yet no over-
riding reason to suppose that meaning-serving intention-
ality is supposed to take the same real time or anything
approximating what a speaker would need if actually lin-
guistically expressing these words and sentences, either in
speech, writing, or any comparable mental echoing or
internal narrating of these linguistic expressions. With
appropriate adjustments, we can in this way hold out the
prospect of extending meaning-serving intentionality to
pre- or extra-linguistic children and animals, on the
assumption that all action is intentional at least in the
action-serving sense, and that pre- and extra-linguistic
children and animals are as capable of action in the proper
sense of the word as mature normally developed human
agents. Dolphins and chimpanzees, and even bees and ants,
do not only react and behave, but act and do things, within
their limitations. They do so, arguably, regardless of
whether or not they are able to act freely, which in the
present context remains an open question philosophically,
even for more cognitively complex fully developed human
beings such as ourselves. If, again, the argument in support
of (2B) can be controverted in this reasonable way, then
alternative (2) may not offer the final word as to the rela-
tion between action-serving and meaning-serving inten-
tionality in referential semantics and action theory,
between meaning theory and the metaphysics of action.
2.3 Semantic-Action Intending Relation (3)
This brings us to alternatives (3) and (4), not precluding the
possibility of returning to (1) or (2) if (3) and (4) should
turn out to be even more problematic or philosophically
unpalatable. Option (3) makes all meaning-serving inten-
tionality a proper subset of action-serving intentionality. A
worthy consideration in support of this model is that an
extended speech act theory, wherein reference in the
symbolic expression of thought in language, and in the
making and use of graphic signs, artwork and artifacts most
generally, is action or actional. The intentionality of speech
acts is distinctively action-serving, with referring and other
rightly so-called speech acts being sheltered under the
general category as a special kind of action, of something
that we do in and with language.
It seems reasonable to suppose that there are referential
and extra-referential actions, but that as actions their
meaning-serving intentionality is one and all more funda-
mentally reducibly action-serving. With a pragmatics of
meaning built into the concept of meaning-serving inten-
tionality as a branch of action-serving intentionality, model
(3) seems powerfully if not yet decisively preferable at
least to alternatives (1) and (2). If referring is something we
do, even if only as a mental act or action, and if there are
actions that do not require, imply or presuppose any
meaning-serving intentionality, then model (3) seems
properly suited to account in particular for the meaning-
serving intentionality of thought and its expression as an
instance, special kind or subcategory, of action-serving
intentionality for one unique (independently) semantically
(as others are morally, aesthetically, economically, etc.)
valued kind of action.
The trouble with proposal (3), despite its virtues, is that
it makes meaning-serving intentionality subordinate to
action-serving intentionality, with the following implica-
tion. If I intend to refer to something as a mental act of
intending, effectively intending to do something, even if
not performing an intended physical action, the question
remains of exactly what it is that I intend to do, of the exact
intended object of my action-serving intention. If I think or
say that the action-serving intention is to tie my shoelaces,
that I tie them, or bring it about that they are tied from a
previous state of being untied, then I will have identified
the intended object of my action semantically as the
meaning-serving intended object of my thought or
expression of a decision or action-serving intention to tie
my shoelaces. This is precisely what happens whenever I
am called upon to articulate or justify rationally what it is I
am trying or may have tried to do. It is a question I can
intelligibly answer only by applying the meaning-serving
intentionality of my reflecting on the intended object of my
action, of what it is that I want or wanted to do.
The asymmetry suggests that action-serving intention-
ality is logically or conceptually dependent on meaning-
serving intentionality, and not the other way around. What I
intend to do is given by the object of my intending thought
when I decide to perform a certain action, even if that action
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is a speech act or referential effort with a distinctively
semantic dimension. My decision is a thought. It is the
decision to do something. Its action-serving intended object
is referentially determined by the decision’s meaning-
serving intending of exactly that object. Every action, we
are supposing, is intentional in the sense of stemming from a
decision to act, where the object of the action is the
semantically intended object of the thought. It is in this same
way that reasoning and rational discourse have at least an
opportunity of linking into the sphere of human action and
its consequences, introducing meaning-serving consider-
ations into deliberations about a specific course of action.
2.4 Semantic-Action Intending Relation (4)
The preferred model described in the criticism of (3) is the
final choice (4). Action-serving intentionality must single
out an intended object of action. It must refer in particular to
a concurrently nonexistent state of affairs as its objective,
that the action, if it succeeds, is intended to bring about or
try to bring about. Actions are not muscle reactions, but
intended channelings of energy of one sort or another,
mental or perceptibly physical, in an intended direction and
toward the accomplishment of a particular intended aim,
goal, target or purpose. Actions are the result of decisions to
act or of act-directing thought of some sort, and these
thoughts, linguistic or otherwise, involved in actions of all
kinds, must also depend on meaning-serving intentions.
Decisions of whatever form must be about whatever state of
affairs is decided upon as the object for an action to try
bringing about, and this is unmistakably a matter of mean-
ing-serving intentionality, of the meaning of a decision to
act, by which an action-serving intentionality is mobilized.
Nor is the predominance of meaning-serving intention-
ality over action-serving intentionality subverted by the
reflection that referring is also a (mental) action or (mental)
doing. Assuming that all action is intentional, and that
referring is a mental and artistic or symbolic linguistic
action, its metaphysical action-serving intended object
once again is precisely the semantic meaning-serving
intended object of the decision to refer, and of the mean-
ing-serving intention to refer to exactly that intended
object. What the intended object of an act of referring or
other speech act is can only be answered by the semantic
intended object of the referring event, irrespective of the
fact that all referring is also an action.





; directly Meaning-Serving intends
(Nonexistent) State of Affairs
(Objective) as Direct Intended Object
of the Decision to Act
The relation diagrammed holds when a decision to act
action-intends the decision’s meaning-intended object. On
the proposed preferred model (4), relating action-serving
and meaning-serving intentionality, a decision action-
intends only via the mediation of the semantic meaning-
serving intentionality of those thoughts in which decisions
to act are made. Model (4), as such, best fits the facts even
when meaning-serving intentionality is ‘reduced’ to the
action-serving intentionality of the undoubtedly mental and
sometimes verbal behavioral action of referring in thought
and its artistic and symbolic expression.
3 Unified Ontology of Action-Serving and Meaning-
Serving Intentionalities
The reduction of action-serving to meaning-serving inten-
tionalities is recommended in model (4) by virtue of its
advantages over the other exclusive and exhaustive alterna-
tives and by the economical picture it offers of how these types
of intending are related to one another, despite superficial
appearances of conceptual disconnection. Nor should we fail to
explain the fact that any action can be understood as a physical
expression of thought, as much as its artistic or symbolic lin-
guistic formulation. In deciding to act, the decision arrived at
and all the thought process leading to it has a semantic
meaning-serving intentionality that locks the resolved-upon
action onto a particular intended object, the nonexistent state of
affairs that the physical action is intended to realize. Referring
and engaging in other speech acts are also actions, doings.
However, their action-serving intentionalities are subordinate
in every case to a predominant meaning-serving intentionality,
so that it is not accidental, purely equivocal, or punning, as
Searle advises, to speak in these situations of the meaning-
serving intention of what it is we mean to do when we arrive at
an appropriate action-serving intention.14
14 I am grateful to the students in my Spring 2013 Proseminar, Die
Philosophie von John R. Searle, for invaluble discussions especially
of Searle’s early view of semantic intentionality and intending to act.
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